I am an assistant professor of accounting at Gabelli School of Business, Fordham University. (Click to see Fordham's Mission Statement)
My research focuses on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and executive compensation.
In the area of CSR, I examine the interplay between firms and their institutional environment. In my dissertation, I propose a new measure to quantify firms’ CSR-related regulatory exposure and examine firms’ responses in the form of CSR investment. In one coauthored paper, we study whether mutual funds claiming to be ESG-designated “walk the talk” and vote favorably on sustainability-related shareholder proposals. In another paper, my coauthors and I examine whether auditors price ex-ante or ex-post climate risks in their audit fees.
In the area of executive compensation, I examine how macroeconomic factors (e.g., international trade and tariffs) affect CEOs’ relative performance evaluation through shaping product market competition. My coauthors and I also highlight an increasing trend of complexity in CEOs’ compensation contracts throughout the most recent decade, furthering our understanding of its determinants and consequences. At the intersection of executive compensation and CSR, I examine what institutional factors prompt the use of CSR performance measures in CEOs’ compensation design.
My research focuses on corporate social responsibility (CSR) and executive compensation.
In the area of CSR, I examine the interplay between firms and their institutional environment. In my dissertation, I propose a new measure to quantify firms’ CSR-related regulatory exposure and examine firms’ responses in the form of CSR investment. In one coauthored paper, we study whether mutual funds claiming to be ESG-designated “walk the talk” and vote favorably on sustainability-related shareholder proposals. In another paper, my coauthors and I examine whether auditors price ex-ante or ex-post climate risks in their audit fees.
In the area of executive compensation, I examine how macroeconomic factors (e.g., international trade and tariffs) affect CEOs’ relative performance evaluation through shaping product market competition. My coauthors and I also highlight an increasing trend of complexity in CEOs’ compensation contracts throughout the most recent decade, furthering our understanding of its determinants and consequences. At the intersection of executive compensation and CSR, I examine what institutional factors prompt the use of CSR performance measures in CEOs’ compensation design.
Email: guoz@fordham.edu